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Primates undoubtedly have impressive abilities in perceiving, recognizing, manipulating, and predicting
other individuals, but only great apes seem to recognize the cognitive basis of manipulative and cooperative
tactics or the concept of self. None of these abilities is unique to primates. We distinguish (1) a package of
quantitative advantages in social sophistication, perhaps based on more efficient memory, in which neocor-
tical enlargement is associated with the challenge of social living; from (2) a qualitative difference in under-
standing, whose taxonomic distribution—including several distantly related species, including birds—
does not point to an evolutionary origin in social challenges andmay instead relate to a need to acquire novel
ways of dealing with the physical world. The ability of great apes to learn new manual routines by parsing
action components may have driven their qualitatively greater social skill, suggesting that strict partition
of physical and social cognition is likely to be misleading.Introduction
Fifty years ago, human experimental psychology was dominated
by learning theory: but the ‘‘cognitive revolution’’ dramatically
changed the nature of research into human behavior. Since
then, neuroscientists have regularly used nonhuman primates
as a ‘‘simpler’’ model to test theories of human social cognition
and information processing, with most laboratory studies of
primates relying on a few species of macaque monkeys. During
the same period, a growing number of psychologists, anthropol-
ogists, and ethologists began studying the social behavior of
a wide range of nonhuman primates, both in the primates’ natural
habitat and in the laboratory, in a parallel attempt to reconstruct
the evolutionary history of human mental competence.
In this review, we shall attempt to explain what these wider-
ranging studies have shown us about nonhuman primate social
cognition, in the hope that it will inform understanding in neuro-
science and new work on humans. It is important to note that
there are numerous differences in behavior between different
primate species, even among different species of monkeys—
as well as between monkeys and great apes, of which humans
are one of several extant species, including orangutans, gorillas,
and chimpanzees. These differences may reflect variations in the
cognitive architecture, or they may result from socioecological
differences between species that limit the expression of similar
underlying cognitive capacity. Where appropriate, we therefore
identify the primate species studied, in order to avoid the trap
of treating all monkey species, or even all nonhuman primates,
as alike in their behavior and cognition.
Mimicking the paradigm shift in human experimental
psychology, there has been a later and more gradual change
toward cognitive explanations of animal behavior. Earlier debates
about behavior were often dominated by the issue of whether
‘‘simple’’ associative learning could account for the data or
whether the animals ‘‘were cognitive,’’ usually taken to mean
having conscious thought processes (Byrne and Bates, 2006;Macphail, 1998). As in the case of human experimental
psychology, the associative approach was not refuted in prin-
ciple, but the sheer effort and increasingly ad hoc appearance
of associationist explanations for complex behavior led to the
ascendance of cognitive theorizing. A particular impetus for
change came from the growing evidence of sophistication and
complexity in primate behavior: in taking account of a rich
network of relationships (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1982a, 1986,
1990), in interpreting others’ intentions (Menzel, 1971, 1974;
Premack, 1988; Premack and Woodruff, 1978), and in deploying
subtle manipulative tactics (Byrne and Whiten, 1985, 1991,
1992; de Waal, 1982, 1986; Whiten and Byrne, 1988). By the
mid-1990s, it had become acceptable to compare across
species by taking a generally cognitive approach, framed in terms
of information processing rather than consciousness (Byrne,
1995; Tomasello and Call, 1997). This shift toward cognitive
explanations of behavior has now left us much better placed to
generate and test hypotheses about the evolution of human
cognitive skill.
Much of the new evidence of complexity in primate behavior
came from the social realm, and comparable sophistication
was not known for physical cognition (Byrne and Whiten, 1988;
Cheney and Seyfarth, 1985; Jolly, 1966). This pattern meshed
with Humphrey’s influential theory (Humphrey, 1976, 1981) that
the evolutionary challenge for which the solution is ‘‘intelligence’’
is more likely a social than a physical one. He argued that semi-
permanent social living, as found in many primate species, sets
up a selective pressure for increasing social sophistication. The
fact that the competitors are conspecifics causes a ‘‘ratchet
effect’’ in which intelligence increases continually. Support for
this line of theorizing has come from finding that the size of the
primate brain—specifically, the neocortex—was closely related
to measures of social group size (Dunbar, 1992a, 1993, 1995,
1998) and social skill (Byrne and Corp, 2004; Reader and Laland,
2001; Reader and Lefebvre, 2001).Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 815
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found in groups where the membership is inconstant, and there
is no evidence that individuals recognize each other as distinct
and base their interactions on this individuality: they are ‘‘herd
animals,’’ but not truly social. (‘‘Hefted’’ ungulates such as
sheep, faithful to a small range during their whole lives, may
however be more socially sophisticated than is often recognized,
for instance, recognizing other individuals by their faces and
voices [Kendrick et al., 1995]; but so far little work on cognitive
skills has been conducted on these animals.) Where groups
are inconstant aggregations, relationships between brain size
and typical group size are lacking (Emery et al., 2007; Shultz
and Dunbar, 2006, 2007), adding further support to the idea of
a close relationship between brain enlargement and semiperma-
nent social living—where groups are consistent in the long term,
but membership can change over time, usually following rules
such as one sex leaves the natal group at sexual maturity.
These lines of evidence led to a consensus view that the early
evolution of human intelligence within the primate lineage
derives from increasing social complexity, as indicated by
concomitant increases in brain size—a hypothesis variously
called ‘‘social intelligence’’ (Humphrey, 1976), ‘‘Machiavellian
intelligence’’ (Byrne, 1996a; Byrne and Whiten, 1988), or the
‘‘social brain’’ (Brothers, 1990; Dunbar, 1998). The corpus of
data has grown rapidly in the last 15 years, enabling us to
examine the strength of this consensus. Where appropriate,
we examine these data against a background of evidence from
the increasing range of species that have now been studied in
cognitive terms (e.g., corvid birds, such as scrub jays, ravens,
and magpies; carnivores, such as domestic dogs, hyaenas,
and meerkats; and ungulates, such as pigs, elephants, and their
cetacean relatives bottlenose dolphins).
Throughout the review, we use the everyday term ‘‘under-
stand’’ for the idea that the animal may represent meaning or
unobservable causal connections in what it does or perceives;
we treat understanding something as a matter of taking account
of its underlying meaning or causal role in an appropriate way.
There is of course a (human) sense of understanding that refers
to private experience and which we will therefore probably never
know about in other animals. Moreover, because humans have
the option of using language to recode and re-represent their
experience, it is highly likely that no nonhuman ‘‘understands’’
things in quite the way an adult human would. These inevitable
differences mean that it remains possible to construct plausible
alternative explanations for virtually all the data of this review, in
terms that have no close relation to human cognition but derive
from behaviorist philosophy and animal learning theory (Heyes,
1994, 1996, 1998; Macphail, 1985, 1998; Penn et al., 2008;
Penn and Povinelli, 2007; Povinelli and Vonk, 2003). Our view
is that, although explanations based on learning theory often
provide valuable critical correction, and connectionist models
of cognitive processes (in some ways the modern equivalent of
the networks of unlabelled associations in behaviorist learning
theory) have achieved notable successes in specific areas
(e.g., Doi et al., 2009; Mayor and Plunkett, 2010), cognitive and
neurocomputational explanations are not mutually exclusive,
but instead provide different levels of explanation, each with
different utility (Byrne and Bates, 2006). In any case, we consider816 Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.it unlikely that disputes about the right approach to under-
standing the nature of cognition will be settled by logic and deci-
sive argument (Garzon and Rodriguez, 2009): which approach
will prove more productive over time is an empirical question.
Primate Abilities in the Social Realm
Knowledge of Other Individuals
We have learned much of what an animal understands about
its companions from field playback of vocalizations. Playback
studies have enabled researchers to simulate signals from
specific individuals or interactions between specific partners
using the target animal’s reaction as an index of what it knows.
For example, playback studies have been used to study indi-
vidual recognition in various animal species. Ground squirrels
(Spermophilus richardsonii), marmots (Marmota flaviventris),
and meerkats (Suricata suricatta) have all been shown to distin-
guish the identity of others from vocalizations. For marmots and
ground squirrels, this allows individuals to determine whether
alarm calls were given by reliable or unreliable group members
(Blumstein et al., 2001; Hare and Atkins, 2001), but the function
of this discrimination ability is not clear for meerkats (Schibler
and Manser, 2007). Playback experiments have shown that
monkeys are aware of the individual identity of others, and not
only those individuals within their own group. Female vervet
monkeys (Chlorocebus aethiops) remain in their natal group
throughout life. When calls from females from groups who had
been neighbors all their lives were broadcast, the target individ-
uals reacted more strongly when the playback suggested the
caller had transferred group (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1982b). (It
is not clear why monkeys should be interested in the demog-
raphy of social groups that they will never enter, but the data
suggest they are.)
Vervet monkey mothers, hearing the cry of an infant, are not
only more reactive toward their own infant’s cry, but when they
are played the calls of other infants they look toward the real
mother, showing they recognize mother-infant relationships
(Cheney and Seyfarth, 1980). Using match-to-sample, this result
was confirmed in captivity for long-tailed monkeys (Macaca
fascicularis) and extended to the sibling relationship (Dasser,
1988), showing that at least two sorts of kin relationship are
distinguished. Moreover, after losing in conflict, monkeys of
several species ‘‘redirect’’ their aggression toward weaker indi-
viduals, but specifically toward relatives of the individual who
defeated them (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1989; Judge, 1982), show-
ing further awareness of kin relationships. (It is not suggested, of
course, that these primates have an understanding of genetical
kinship anything like that of humans.)
Some Old World monkey species give specific greeting calls
to dominants and subordinates. When target vervet monkeys
hear playbacks, their reaction depends on the rank relationship
between themselves and the caller. When the caller is dominant
to themselves, and gives a ‘‘call to dominant,’’ their agitated
reaction suggests that they expect a high-ranking individual
nearby; whereas if the same monkey gives a ‘‘call to subordi-
nate’’ or if a monkey subordinate to themselves gives a ‘‘call to
dominant,’’ they give little reaction: they understand the ranks
of third parties relative to each other (Cheney and Seyfarth,
1982a). Playback can even be used to simulate interactions
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sounds that suggest a rank reversal in the dominance hierarchy,
they react with surprise, specifically if the reversal suggests that
the normally stable rank relationships between matrilineal fami-
lies have changed (Bergman et al., 2003). Baboons evidently
‘‘eavesdrop’’ on social relationships: when playback simulated
a consorting pair moving apart, which would normally signal
a mating opportunity, other males were quick to head for the
‘‘female’’ (Crockford et al., 2007). Thus it seems that some
nonhuman primates are able to categorize rank relationships in
very much the same ways as do the humans who study them,
showing knowledge of relationships among third parties and
not just with respect to themselves, and of the likely degree of
stability of rank relationships.
The significance of these findings, from a cognitive perspec-
tive, is the implication they have for memory. If an animal distin-
guishes its social companions and immediate neighbors as
individuals, and knows where each ranks in comparison with
others, and which other individuals stand in some sort of kin
relationship to it, then the memory load increases exponentially
with group size. In contrast, if an individual reacts to most con-
specifics merely on the basis of their appearance and demeanor,
as may generally be the case in many socially monogamous
birds and herd species, then memory load is independent of
group size; and if it reacts on the basis only of a dyadic relation-
ship with itself, such as the dominance relationship from recent
encounters, then memory load increases only linearly. Although
primate-like sociality is infrequent among other mammals, some
species of carnivore, equines, certain dolphin and whale
species, and all species of elephant live in groups where they
are part of a semipermanent network rather than an amorphous
herd. Social knowledge has yet to be explored in most of
these taxa, but work has already begun. Most strikingly, using
playback of vocalizations, African elephants (Loxodonta afri-
cana) have been shown to distinguish at least 80 individuals as
familiar, compared to those less familiar to them in the much
larger social network (McComb et al., 2000). It is not known
how much information they remember about each of these
individuals or even whether they are all recognized as such.
However, in the same population, elephants have been shown
to recognize as individuals, and keep track of among their
traveling party, at least 17 female family members based on
olfactory cues found in urine (Bates et al., 2008b), and it is
therefore entirely possible that elephant knowledge of familiar
conspecifics is as deep as that of primates, but over a much
larger number of individuals.
Social Tactics
As well as good evidence that primates recognize individuals,
kinship, rank, and the third-party relationships between others,
there is now extensive evidence that many species of primate
regularly deploy subtle or manipulative social tactics during
intragroup competition with these individuals.
While dominance rank is just as important for a primate as it is
for other social animals, rank is less likely to be a function of
physical power, often deriving instead from the support of third
parties (and this is not unique to primates: e.g., zebras [Schilder,
1990]). In female-resident monkeys like macaques, the mother
may support her offspring against others ranking below her,and in particular her youngest offspring: the result is that
offspring attain dominance ranks just below that of their mother,
with the youngest the highest ranked (Sade, 1967). In all Old
World monkeys, grooming is used to build up alliances that
accrue future benefits in other currencies (Dunbar, 1991), varying
the exchange rate in a ‘‘biological market’’ (Fruteau et al., 2009).
Long-lasting social bonds ‘‘pay’’ in reproductive terms: the
offspring of baboons that form strong social bonds with other
females live longer, independently of health differences between
the parents, and the effects persist into offspring adulthood (Silk
et al., 2009).
Monkeys are selective in whom they choose to form alliances
with, targeting their grooming and other affiliative interactions
specifically at the most useful allies, such as those who are domi-
nant or who offer other benefits (Cheney, 1978; Harcourt, 1992).
The same specificity in allocation of grooming to the most useful
allies has recently been found in meerkats (Kutsukake and
Clutton-Brock, 2010) and is perhaps likely in all social species
that show allogrooming. Vervet monkeys are more responsive
to the (experimentally played back) vocal signals of individuals
who have recently groomed them, provided they are not
close kin, to whom their responsiveness is always high (Seyfarth
and Cheney, 1984). When their most important alliances are
disrupted by competition, apes and monkeys of many species
make efforts to reconcile afterward: they are more likely to
initiate grooming with a recent opponent than expected from
control observations (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1989; Cords, 1992;
de Waal and van Roosmalen, 1979; de Waal and Aureli, 1996;
Kappeler, 1993). In baboons, vocalizations can be used effec-
tively to reconcile with former opponents, at a distance (Cheney
et al., 1995); and even a friendly grunt given by the close kin of
a recent opponent serves to reconcile recent aggressors (Wittig
et al., 2007b). Likewise, support in aggressive contests can
effectively be given by vocalization, creating a ‘‘vocal alliance’’
(Wittig et al., 2007a), and baboons can infer the target of a
vocalization from the context (Engh et al., 2006). Nurturing and
repairing alliances among non-kin suggests that primates in
some way understand that grooming, perhaps as an honest
indicator of time invested (Dunbar, 1992b), can be traded in
the expectation of future benefits—a form of reciprocal altruism
(Trivers, 1971). (Interestingly, in general, evidence for reciprocal
altruism among any nonhuman animals, including primates, is
sparse and insecure [Clutton-Brock, 2009]). One of the most
intriguing ways in which primates manipulate their companions
is shown in ‘‘policing,’’ found in some macaque species, where
a powerful individual intervenes to break up fights among subor-
dinates (de Waal, 1989): the cost of policing falls only on the
intervener, but the benefits accrue to all, making policing rela-
tively unlikely to evolve (Flack et al., 2005). Flack and her collab-
orators have used the technique of ‘‘knocking out’’ particular
individuals in a large group of pig-tailed macaques (Macaca
nemestrina) to investigate experimentally whether policing is
effective, finding that infrequent policing by a few powerful indi-
viduals significantly preserves the stability of social networks in
the face of perturbations (Flack et al., 2006). Whether this
form of ‘‘niche construction’’ (Odling-Smee et al., 2003) is based
on innate tendencies in pig-tailed macaques or some under-
standing of the social mechanisms is unknown.Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 817
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seen in defense against predators or competing groups of
conspecifics, or cooperative breeding systems such as those
of callitrichid primates (Burkart and van Schaik, 2010), evidence
for other forms of cooperation is more controversial. Cooperative
hunting in wild chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) has long been
described (Teleki, 1973), but although the converging chimpan-
zees must seem cooperative to the out-maneuvered prey
individual, it is also possible that each chimpanzee follows its
individually best strategy (Busse, 1976). A strong case for more
than this has been made in the case of Taı¨ chimpanzees of
Ivory Coast, a population known for high levels of hunting: coor-
dinated and distinctive individual roles have been described,
including ‘‘driver’’ and ‘‘ambusher’’ (Boesch, 1994). Yet at
Ngogo, Uganda, a study site where hunting is even more preva-
lent and similarly appears cooperative, the researchers were
unable to be sure that more than individual selfish tactics
were involved (Watts and Mitani, 2002). Cooperative hunting is
routine in many social carnivores (e.g., spotted hyaenas [Crocuta
crocuta], some populations of lions [Panthera leo], and wolves
[Canis lupus] [Grinnell et al., 1995; Holekamp, 2006; Mech, 1970;
Stander, 1992]) and at least one bird, the Harris’s hawk (Parabu-
teo unicinctus; Bednarz, 1988). Although Stander describes
female lions taking account of the movements of others during
hunts, the extent to which cooperation is based on any under-
standing of the strategies of others is usually unknown. An
elegant exception is the work of Drea and Carter (2009) who pre-
sented pairs of spotted hyaenas with a rope-pulling task that
could only be solved by cooperation. They found that hyaenas
cooperated quickly and repeatedly but also improved over
time as individuals increasingly took account of the actions of
the other and showed accommodation toward a naive partner.
Captive studies show that, in principle, chimpanzees should
be able to engineer cooperation, since they are able to under-
stand another’s role in a two-role task, in which one player is
able to see which of several handles will result in food reward
for both participants, but only the other player can reach the
handles (Povinelli et al., 1992a). In the same task, rhesus
monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were able to learn either role—but
when roles were switched, the monkeys had to relearn the task
from scratch, showing that, unlike chimpanzees, they had no
real understanding of the cooperation involved (Povinelli et al.,
1992b). When confronted with a task that requires cooperation,
chimpanzees may need to learn how to recruit another individual
to help (Hirata and Fuwa, 2007), but when proficient they select
individuals to recruit who have previously been the most effec-
tive collaborators (Melis et al., 2006a). Whether chimpanzees
do cooperate or not has been found to depend on the degree
of social tolerance between the individuals (Melis et al., 2006b),
and their higher general level of social tolerance allows captive
bonobos (Pan paniscus)—sometimes called the pygmy chim-
panzee, and a species not described to cooperate in the
wild—to out-perform chimpanzees in cooperative tasks (Hare
et al., 2007). Although in general monkeys have failed to give
evidence of cooperative abilities, cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus
oedipus), a cooperatively breeding species, not only performed
well in a two-role task but showed similar capacities to chimpan-
zees in understanding the role of the other (Cronin et al., 2005).818 Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.These studies suggest that temperament may be more impor-
tant that cognitive architecture in whether or not a species is
able to cooperate efficiently.
Tactics of social manipulation that rely on deception for their
effect are well documented in many species of primate (Byrne
and Whiten, 1990; Mitchell and Thompson, 1986). In most cases,
there is little reason to think that the subjects themselves under-
stand the act of deception—that is, creating a false belief in
the deceived individual—and the data can instead be under-
stood as a result of rapid learning in social circumstances, with
no insight into how they work (Byrne, 1997b). However, there
are a number of cases of deception, specifically in the great
apes, which are very hard to explain in this way, and some
understanding of mental states becomes a more plausible
explanation (Byrne and Whiten, 1992). In corvine birds, too,
deliberate deception has been described in the context of
hiding or ‘‘caching’’ surplus food, found in several species. Scrub
jays (Aphelocoma californica) react to others’ seeing them cache
their food, by recaching it once they get the chance, in private—
but only if they themselves have prior experience of pilfering the
caches of others (Emery and Clayton, 2001). When hiding food
items, jays prefer locations behind barriers or in shady locations.
Ravens (Corvus corax) also take close account of who might
have seen them make caches, and among other strategies may
make ‘‘false caches’’ of nonexistent or trivial items when com-
petitors are watching, delaying their approach to a cache if com-
petitors are nearby, and searching at false sites until the compet-
itor has left (Bugnyar and Kotrschal, 2004). We shall return to the
cognitive implications of deliberate deception, below.
Perceiving Others
Many species of animal are known to distinguish a range of
conspecific displays and body postures, including facial expres-
sions; the greater the degree of control of facial musculature, the
larger the number of facial expressions that may need to be
recognized. However, displays and expressions are to a large
extent under the control of the signaler, and what information
it wishes to share: it would be of great utility to a competitor,
therefore, if the involuntary or inevitable movements of the eyes,
head, and body that show the gaze direction and (presumably)
the focus of an individual’s visual attention could also be read.
Consequently, much effort has been devoted to understanding
primate abilities at gaze following and reading the attention of
others.
Gaze following is known in many species of animal (e.g., great
apes [Bra¨uer et al., 2005], goats [Kaminski et al., 2005], ravens
[Bugnyar et al., 2004], ibises, Geronticus eremita [Loretto et al.,
2010]) and is often taken to be an automatic, almost reflexive
tendency. However, research on monkeys has found gaze
following to depend on the particular facial expression of the
model (Goossens et al., 2008) and that the ability to accurately
follow gaze develops between infancy and adulthood (Ferrari
et al., 2008); neither finding is consistent with the interpretation
as a reflex. Moreover, in some species, gaze following is
‘‘smart’’—that is, subjects are able to follow gaze geometrically.
Analysis of collated records of primate deception suggested
that Old World monkeys and apes are able to represent the
geometric perspective of other individuals (Whiten and Byrne,
1988), although this was later disputed for monkeys (Kummer
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geometrically, looking ‘‘behind’’ barriers that occlude the view
from their own perspective, has been shown in several species
(chimpanzees [Tomasello et al., 1999], spider monkeys, Ateles
geoffroyi [Amici et al., 2009], ravens [Bugnyar et al., 2004]), but
not ibises (Loretto et al., 2010). In the wild, bee-eaters (Merops
orientalis) have been found to be able to take the perspective
of their predators, showing one obvious benefit of the ability to
follow gaze geometrically (Watve et al., 2002).
It would seem obvious that gaze following also indicates
particular places, objects, or activities that are the focus of
others’ attention. Oddly, it has been surprisingly difficult to
show that species gain useful information of this kind from gaze
following: for instance, in finding food in an object-choice exper-
iment, domestic dogs far outperform chimpanzees (Bra¨uer et al.,
2006; but see Krachun and Call, 2009). (Hand-reared wolves do
not follow human gaze, apparently because they tend to avoid
looking at faces, so are unable to learn the significance of gaze
direction [Miklo´si et al., 2003]). Even monkeys, able to use human
pointing and other communicative cues, and to follow gaze, do
not seem to be able to use gaze as a cue (Hauser et al., 2007).
Recently, however, object choice on the basis of gaze following
has been shown in lemurs, Eulemur spp. (Ruiz et al., 2009),
although not at high levels of success. Ruiz et al. suggest
that their results may not reflect a mentalistic understanding of
what gaze means but rather that lemurs are equipped with two
useful tendencies: gaze following, in which gaze is traced to its
end point (perhaps geometrically); and gaze cueing, in which
the objects at that point are investigated preferentially. With
such tendencies, lemurs gain the benefit of having their attention
drawn to useful objects and places, without perhaps under-
standing anything about what is in the mind of the individual
whose attention they follow. We take it that other primate species
will prove to have similar capacities, when analyses focus on the
lower levels of success in object choice that they allow. (Ravens,
whose performance is very like that of chimpanzees, have been
shown able to use gaze for object choice with only small modifi-
cations of procedure [Schloegl et al., 2008a, 2008b].) Whether
higher rates of success in using gaze to choose objects, as
shown for instance in dogs, need any more mentalistic interpre-
tation is not known.
Understanding of the perceptual significance of another
individual’s perspective has been much more readily shown in
gestural communication. Great apes are sensitive to the ability
of their audience to perceive gestures, choosing tactile or audi-
tory modality when the target audience is not looking, and silent
visual gestures only when they are (chimpanzees [Tomasello and
Call, 2007; Tomasello et al., 1994], bonobos [Pika, 2007a],
gorillas, Gorilla gorilla [Genty et al., 2009; Pika, 2007b], orangu-
tans, Pongo spp. [Liebal, 2007; Liebal et al., 2006]). Moreover,
some individual apes have shown that they understand the utility
of concealing embarrassingly revealing signals, such as a chim-
panzee who was once noticed to hide his penile erection from
a dominant male until it subsided (de Waal, 1982), or a gorilla
who regularly hid her play face in order to surprise a play partner
(Tanner and Byrne, 1993). The interpretation of these data
shades into issues of understanding of the other’s thoughts, dis-
cussed below.In the great apes, there is evidence for ‘‘triadic’’ interactions, in
which two individuals interact both with each other and with an
object, paying attention to the nature of the other’s interaction
with the object (bonobos, playing with humans [Pika and
Zuberbu¨hler, 2008]; gorillas, playing with each other [Tanner
and Byrne, 2010]). The apes encouraged reluctant partners
back into the game and moderated their own abilities to continue
the game as collaboration, in striking contrast to their normal
competitiveness over food items.
As with gaze following, shared attention to objects and the
‘‘intersubjectivity’’ shown in triadic interactions over objects
have been suggested to be important developmental precursors
to theory of mind in humans (Trevarthen, 1977, 1980). One theory
of why nonhuman primates do not develop further along this
route is that they lack the ability to make use of ostension,
whereas the human infant is equipped to receive and use
this ‘‘natural pedagogy’’ (Csibra and Gergely, 2009) and is thus
much better able to profit from human demonstrations. The
general lack of pedagogical teaching among all nonhuman
primates supports this conjecture. Functionally defined teaching
has been recorded in several species of animal, including ants,
babblers, meerkats, cheetahs, and several callitrichid primates
(Caro and Hauser, 1992; Thornton and Raihani, 2008). But
none of these data suggest that the teacher understands the
(lack of) knowledge of the learner; in contrast, observations
suggesting deliberate pedagogy are very rare (chimpanzees
[Boesch, 1991], killer whales, Orcinus orca [Guinet and Bouvier,
1995]) and, consequently, hard to interpret. However, other
evidence does not support the uniqueness of human ostension.
Whole-hand pointing is used and understood by chimpanzees
(Leavens et al., 1996; Leavens and Hopkins, 1999), and free-
ranging rhesus monkeys have been found to follow a range of
human communicative gestures, including pointing and head-
indications after eye contact was established, using them to
locate hidden food (Hauser et al., 2007).
Predicting and Understanding the Actions of Others
The ability to predict what others are likely to do next can be
critical for survival. It is evident that a wide range of animals
are well able to extrapolate the current behavior of conspecifics,
predators or prey, to anticipate what their next actions might
be; but the evidence that they may also do this on the basis of
understanding (representing unobservable causal factors) is
more difficult to obtain.
In the case of social cognition, a key distinction for people is
between accidental and intentional action, and whether non-
human primates feel similarly has been investigated in various
ways. A captive chimpanzee, when a person ‘‘accidentally’’
spilled its prized orange drink and gave it nothing, subsequently
continued to beg from that person; but if the loss appeared delib-
erate, with the juice just poured away, the chimpanzee avoided
that person in the future (Povinelli, 1991). However, it is difficult
to disentangle the influence of emotion from knowledge in
such a dyadic interaction, and when strict controls for demeanor
were made the effect disappeared (Povinelli et al., 1998; see also
Call et al., 2004). To avoid this problem, chimpanzees, orangu-
tans, and children were trained on a simple task, where the
rewarded choice was cued by previously placing a mark over
the site; when additional, apparently ‘‘accidental’’ cues wereNeuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 819
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same way (Call and Tomasello, 1998). At first, the accidental
cues were just ignored, showing clear understanding of the dis-
tinction; when the ‘‘accidental’’ marking continued, both apes
and children began to investigate, choosing them instead—
but, gaining no rewards, they later returned to following only
the deliberately placed cues.
The signals that indicated intention in the experiments dis-
cussed so far are normal everyday actions for the humans whose
behavior the animals had to interpret; thus, it is possible that
the subjects had been able to learn that such signals carried
meaning from their past experience alone. What happens
when a wholly new gesture is employed? Humans are able to
relate the form of a gesture to the constraints of the environment:
if one’s hands are full, one can ‘‘point’’ with an elbow or foot and
be readily understood. Nonhuman primates show the same
flexibility, with identical results in cotton-top tamarins, rhesus
monkeys, and chimpanzees (Wood and Hauser, 2008). When
an experimenter, carrying a large object, touched one of two
food wells with his elbow, the subjects responded just as if he
had used his hand normally, preferentially investigating that
place. But when the same experimenter used his elbow, in the
same way but with his hands not engaged, the gesture was
ignored, just as was a hand-touch that looked unintentional.
A similar ability, to differentiate the relevance of an action from
its situational context, has been noted when preverbal infants
copy actions (Gergely et al., 2002). When a switch is pushed
with the experimenter’s head, the infant only copies that detail
if the model’s hands are free; if he is holding a cloak, then the
infant simply uses her hand: this has been described as ‘‘rational
imitation.’’ Modifications of this paradigm have been used with
chimpanzees that have been reared with humans, and with
domestic dogs; in both cases, the subjects showed ‘‘rational’’
selectivity of what to imitate (Buttelmann et al., 2007; Range
et al., 2007).
Understanding of Another’s Thoughts
Often treated as the cognitive Rubicon between humans and
other animals, the suite of abilities that ultimately allows us to
interpret other people’s actions in an intentional way as a conse-
quence of their desires, knowledge, and beliefs has been subject
to immense research activity over the 30-odd years since
Premack and Woodruff first asked, ‘‘Does the chimpanzee
have a theory of mind’’? (Call and Tomasello, 2008; Premack
and Woodruff, 1978). We can give here only a sparse summary
of this literature for nonhuman primates.
Throughout the period, there has been something of a gulf
between the conclusions of observers of natural primate
behavior and those who carry out controlled laboratory studies
(de Waal, 1991). Of course, it is easy to overinterpret the richness
of observations, and experiments may fail for many reasons
other than cognitive limitations of the subjects, so some gap is
to be expected—but in this case, more seems to be going on.
In particular, analysis of primate behavioral deception based
on observational data concluded that, although most records
could well reflect no more than rapid learning in social contexts,
some did imply more (Byrne and Whiten, 1985, 1992; Whiten and
Byrne, 1988; for chimpanzees, specifically, see also de Waal,
1982, 1986). Evidence was noted that great apes of all species820 Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.seemed to represent the ignorance, knowledge, and false belief
of other individuals. This proposal has been the subject of much
dispute and many empirical studies.
An early paradigm for investigating whether animals under-
stand the difference between knowledge and ignorance and
realize the connection between seeing and knowledge has
been called the ‘‘guesser/knower’’ design (Povinelli et al., 1990).
In it, the subject is confronted with conflicting hints as to
which of several sites has been baited: from one individual
who was clearly present at and able to see the baiting, the
knower, and one who was not, the guesser. Initial reports that
chimpanzees could solve this puzzle whereas rhesus monkeys
could not (Povinelli et al., 1991) were challenged because
experiments gave differential reward during testing, and thus
rapid learning might simulate understanding (Heyes, 1993).
Careful reanalysis showed this to be very possible (Povinelli,
1994). A subsequent study with domestic pigs, using a design
that avoided rewarded test trials and using conspecifics as infor-
mants rather than humans, identified one pig that apparently
understood the seeing/knowing connection, although other
subjects’ data were ambiguous (Held et al., 2001). Extensive
work with chimpanzees, using a simpler paradigm in which the
subject must beg for food from an experimenter who may or
may not be able to see them, concluded that the chimpanzee
has no general understanding of the relationship between seeing
and knowing (Povinelli et al., 2000; Povinelli and Eddy, 1996;
Povinelli et al., 1994).
One possible problem with these designs is that they depend
on the subjects taking cues from helpful onlookers, or expecting
help from others: chimpanzees and indeed most nonhuman
primates may have little natural experience with such coopera-
tive interactions (Hare and Tomasello, 2004). Suspecting that
this might have been the problem, Hare and coworkers designed
a competitive perspective-taking task, in which the subject must
assess what its (dominant) competitor has been able to see
of foods that may be hidden by visual barriers and avoid
competing for food that it knows about (Hare et al., 2000). With
this design, chimpanzees clearly showed that they were well
able to compute what a competitor had seen from witnessing
the situation from its own perspective, confirming the evidence
for geometric perspective taking discussed already. Moreover,
when the competitor was swapped for another equally dominant
individual, mid-experiment, the subjects took account of the
lack of prior exposure of the newcomer: they were apparently
able to represent what others had previously seen, in other words
what they know, as well as what they can currently see (Hare
et al., 2001). Although some still dispute this interpretation
(Karin-D’Arcy and Povinelli, 2002; Povinelli and Vonk, 2003),
considerable converging evidence now supports the contention
that chimpanzees can appreciate the knowledge versus igno-
rance of other individuals (Call and Tomasello, 2008; Tomasello
et al., 2003). When tested in a competitive situation, rhesus
monkeys also show understanding of the visual perspective of
others: where they could steal a grape from one of two humans,
they reliably chose the person who was unable to see their action
(Flombaum and Santos, 2005). Similarly, monkeys evidently
understand the connection between hearing and knowing,
preferring to take food from ‘‘quiet’’ containers that will not alert
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Experimental study of caching in scrub jays suggests, in this
corvine bird, understanding of knowledge similar to that found
in chimpanzees. If two (jay) competitors have seen a jay cache
different items in different places, the jay remembers who has
seen what, and takes measures appropriately when confronted
with one or the other competitor (Dally et al., 2006).
It is much less clear whether any nonhuman species under-
stands the concept of false belief: part of the problem is that
experiments with nonverbal subjects can easily become very
complex, which itself may make for failure. Kaminski and
colleagues attempted to tackle this question by using a compet-
itive game between two individuals, either children or chimpan-
zees, in which the subject could make only one choice in each
trial: they could opt for turning over one of three cups, having
seen a high-quality food item placed under one of them, or
choose a low-quality reward instead (Kaminski et al., 2008).
The two subjects took it in turn to choose first, and the second
could not see what the first had chosen: the high-quality item
might already have been taken by then. Indeed, when they had
seen a cup baited with a high-quality food, and also seen that
the other saw the same baiting process, both 6-year-old children
and chimpanzees wisely avoided that choice when it was their
turn. Both species therefore showed differentiation between
knowledge and ignorance. In a second experiment, the experi-
menter picked up the food after the baiting process and either
put it back or moved it to a new location: conditions differed in
whether both subjects, or only the second to choose, saw this
extra move. In the latter instance, the smart strategy is to go
for the high-quality food, since the first subject should have
falsely believed that the food was elsewhere and wasted
their turn. Six-year-old children, but not 3-year-olds, used this
strategy, showing that the task was not too complicated for older
children to use their understanding of false beliefs in its solution.
The chimpanzees did not. However, other work suggests that
babies much younger than 3 years can represent false beliefs
(Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate et al., 2007), so the
failure of the 3-year-old children—and thus also of the chimpan-
zees—in Kaminski et al.’s task may after all reflect confusion
from the task’s complexity.
Rather similar findings were obtained with free-ranging rhesus
monkeys, using a simpler design (Santos et al., 2007). Santos
and colleagues used an expectancy-violation experiment, using
looking-time as an indication of surprise, based on the task orig-
inally devised for human infants (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005).
Subjects were presented with a stage on which a plastic lemon
was able to move on a track, from side to side: in the critical
trials, the human presenter was apparently unable to see some
of the movements of the lemon because of an occluder, although
the monkey could. Thus, if the occluder was absent and the
presenter watched closely while the lemon moved to a new loca-
tion, they should have a true belief of its position; but if the
occluder blocked their view during the same move, they should
have a false belief (out of date information) about the current
position. When monkeys watched the presenter’s subsequent
search for the lemon, their looking times showed that they
expected the presenter to search in the right location in the
true-belief condition and were surprised (longer looking time) ifthey searched elsewhere. However, in the false-belief condition,
looking times did not differ: monkeys, unlike human infants,
appeared not to have any expectations in this case (Santos
et al., 2007). Perhaps the only animal able to compute the
consequences of a false belief in another is the human; but the
deceptive behavior of corvids and great apes is in conflict with
that conjecture, and resolution is needed.
Understanding the Self
Against the background we have so far sketched of impressive
abilities in perceiving, recognizing, understanding, and interpret-
ing other individuals, one failing is striking in animals: the failure
to recognize the subject’s own face in a mirror. Of course, indi-
viduals of any species would need experience to grasp the
true origin of the realistic moving image they see in a mirror—
even humans, as first contacts with New Guinea highlanders
showed repeatedly in the last century. But animals that live as
human pets or that are given months to explore a fixed mirror
in a zoo cage have ample opportunities: to touch its surface; to
notice the match between the fingers, paws, hooves, etc., visible
in and on the mirror; to observe parts of their own body and those
of other individuals, both directly and in the mirror, moving in
step. Nevertheless, the great majority of animals persist in giving
‘‘social’’ responses, as if the image were another individual not
themselves, or learn only to avoid looking at the mirror. Even
monkeys, many species of which have been tested with the
classic ‘‘mark test’’ (Gallop, 1970), where a surreptitious mark
is placed on a part of the head which the animal cannot see,
completely fail to give any evidence that they realize the face in
the mirror is their own (Parker et al., 1994). (And other paradigms
that have been claimed to show self-recognition in monkeys
remain highly controversial [Anderson and Gallup, 1997; Hauser
et al., 1995]). It is not that monkeys cannot understand the
geometric transformation produced by a mirror, because they
readily learn to use a mirror to guide out-of-sight actions
(Anderson, 1984). But those species that recognize themselves
in mirrors are the exceptions.
All species of great ape do recognize themselves in mirrors
(Parker et al., 1994; Povinelli et al., 1993), although not every
individual of any of them (Mitchell, 1996; Swartz and Evans,
1991). Similar evidence of self-recognition, including appropriate
responses in the mark test, has been found in a corvine bird:
the magpie, Pica pica (Prior et al., 2008). In addition, both bottle-
nose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus) and gibbons (Hylobates spp.)
have given indications that they understand their mirror images,
such as mirror-contingent movements and use of the mirror to
inspect parts of their body (Hyatt, 1998; Reiss and Marino,
2001; Ujhelyi et al., 2000); it is difficult to see how dolphins
could do much more to convince, whereas gibbons have repeat-
edly failed the mark test (Suddendorf and Collier-Baker, 2009).
Asian elephants (Elaphus maximus) have been tested for mirror
self-recognition several times, with mixed results (Plotnik et al.,
2006; Povinelli, 1989; Simonet, 2000). Plotnik and colleagues
report one elephant that responded quite differently when it
had been surreptitiously marked with a visible spot, and did
not do so when sham-marked invisibly, suggesting self-recogni-
tion; however, these responses were not immediate on catching
sight of its mirror image, as is seen in the case of great apes, nor
particularly performed in front of the mirror.Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 821
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accomplishing what appears to be a simple matching task—
and therefore what is special about humans and other great
apes, magpies, and probably dolphins and elephants—it may
help to consider another ‘‘strangely lacking’’ sign of under-
standing: that of death. Whereas humans are highly disturbed
by the death of a close companion and usually show some
sort of mourning, most animals do not. Farmed red deer (Cervus
elaphus), for instance, give no reaction beyond a brief startle
when one of their daily companions is shot through the head
and falls dead as they feed around it (John Fletcher, personal
communication): they are habituated to the sound of a gun,
and no distress signals are given by the deer because it dies
instantly. Stillborn infants are often carried or groomed by their
mothers, in monkeys and especially great apes, and also some-
times by carnivores like leopard (Panthera pardus); but it is diffi-
cult to interpret these isolated observations. The behavior of
African elephants, then, stands out, because they show a special
interest in the bodies of their kind, as well as showing empathic
and helpful reactions toward distressed or dying individuals
(Douglas-Hamilton et al., 2006); these behaviors are directed
toward both kin and non-kin. Experimentally, stronger reactions
of curiosity and exploration were shown to elephant bones
and tusks (washed clean of scent with detergent) compared
with similar-sized bones of other species (McComb et al.,
2006). While the elephant graveyard is a hoary myth, elephants
do seem to show strong and unusual reactions to the death of
a conspecific compared to most species. The recent description
of the death of a chimpanzee within a cohesive and long-estab-
lished social group strongly suggested that this species, too, has
some understanding of death (Anderson et al., 2010): predeath
care, inspection of the body for signs of life, nighttime atten-
dance at the corpse by relatives, and later avoidance of the
site of death.
Since individuals of almost every social species will have
opportunities to observe conspecific death and its conse-
quences, the real mystery is why such reactions are so rare.
One possibility is that, without a representation of the self as
an entity, the death of others has no personal significance,
unless one is immediately dependent on their aid. Similarly,
without a mental representation of the self as independent entity,
it may be impossible to understand the face staring back from
the mirror. If so, then those species likely to react with under-
standing to the death of others should be specifically those
showing self-recognition (as suggested by Gallup, 1979). This
hypothesis could be tested by further research on reactions to
conspecific death, concentrating on species well-known to be
able or unable to recognize themselves in a mirror. Reactions
to the death of companions and recognition of the self are
phenomena that may also relate to a general capacity for
empathy, which has similarly been identified in the great apes
(de Waal, 2008, 2009) and in elephants (Bates et al., 2008a).
What Underlies Primate Social Sophistication?
As this brief review has demonstrated, social sophistication is by
no means unique to primates, nor is it uniform within nonhuman
primate species. Unfortunately, comparable work on many other
species is still in its infancy compared to that on primates, so822 Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.there is no ‘‘level playing field’’ of comparison. Based on the
evidence currently available, however, we shall distinguish
between social complexity that is a matter of degree—knowl-
edge ofmore social companions, more frequent use of alliances,
more complicated manipulative tactics that depend on picking
more subtle aspects of behavior, finer and more elaborate cate-
gorizations, larger brain (part) sizes that correlate with larger
social groups—from social complexity that requires a deeper
understanding of mechanism and mind, including the under-
standing of the self as an entity and perhaps of the false beliefs
of others, which is apparently very much more limited. In the
case of great apes, there is some evidence for both of these
features. In other taxa, it may be that either type of social sophis-
tication can occur without the other—for instance, social carni-
vores apparently show quantitative social complexity, whereas
some corvids give evidence of deeper understanding—so the
selective pressures that led to their evolution may be different
in kind. We shall examine the pattern of species differences
in social sophistication, using the comparative method, for
evidence of their evolutionary origins, and assess whether these
‘‘two types of intelligence’’ derived from the same or different
selection pressures. Then, we shall return to the issue of what
cognitive mechanisms might underlie the social competence
seen in animals.
Evolution of Species Differences in Intellectual Ability
Theories of what led ultimately to human intelligence abound, but
to assess them it is critical that the pattern of abilities among
living primates and other relevant species be properly character-
ized. Use of brain size (or neocortex size, executive brain size,
etc.), appropriately scaled against the rest of the brain, as a proxy
for intelligence has shown increases with group or clique size
in all groups of primates (Barton and Dunbar, 1997; Barton
and Harvey, 2000; Dunbar, 1992a, 1998), giving strength to
Humphrey and Jolly’s earlier suggestions that social complexity
selects for intellectual increase (Humphrey, 1976; Jolly, 1966).
(Scaling against body size is inappropriate for estimating the
intellectual potential of a given brain size, although it has
often been used for that purpose. Instead, it is useful as
a measure of the brain’s ‘‘cost’’ to the animal [Byrne, 1996b]).
Comparing with data from other mammals gives support to
social complexity as the forcing function that leads to quantita-
tive increases in social skills. Similar correlations to those found
in primates, between neocortex enlargement and social group
size, have been found in carnivores, insectivores, and bats
(Barton et al., 1995; Dunbar and Bever, 1998). In even-toed
ungulates, none of whose cognitive abilities seem to rival those
of primates, there is no similar relationship between brain size
and group size (Shultz and Dunbar, 2007), presumably because
individual recognition and social differentiation is not a feature of
these groups. However, among birds, where the common asso-
ciation pattern is social monogamy, and no group-size effects
have been found, ape-like abilities have been discovered in
corvids (ravens, scrub-jays, magpies); they evidently cannot be
explained in the same way (Emery et al., 2007). This strongly
supports the speculation that two different evolutionary pres-
sures have effected change in animal intelligence.
If, at least among mammals, living in a semipermanent social
group presents a particularly acute intellectual challenge (Byrne
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Two main suggestions have been made:
(1) Arms-race. Social competition within the group may favor
those with greatest social ability, and hence brain size, but in
the next generation the population averages will have increased,
giving a runaway arms-race (Humphrey, 1976). But the tendency
to create an arms-race would seem to be shared with other
theories: for instance, social competition by means of skilful
interaction with the environment, promoting increased physical
cognition; and interactions with food competitors, predators or
prey. (And in the latter case, the evolutionary pressure is greater
as the stakes are higher.) Also, in general, kin relationships within
primate groups might be expected to reduce the benefits of any
individual competition within the group.
(2) Unpredictability. Whereas the environment may be com-
plex but is ultimately predictable, social interactions with simi-
larly intelligent, behaving agents will always remain more difficult
(Barton, 2006). But, again, predator/prey interaction is surely just
as unpredictable, and finally more critical, as lives are at stake.
Fossil evidence supports the conjecture that predator-prey
interactions are a powerful selection factor for intelligence, with
arms-races between predators and prey evident in the step-
by-step increases in brain size of both, coevolving in the same
continent (Jerison, 1973), and reduction of brain size in island
species lacking predators, compared to their relatives and
ancestors in continental habitats (Byrne and Bates, 2007). As
a resolution of this issue, we suggest that all competition
that is based on knowledge of the behavior of animate entities
should be seen as affecting ‘‘social’’ cognition (Byrne and Bates,
2007); continual unpredictability is found, and arms races are set
in train, whether the challenge is dealing with predators or
companions.
However, it may be that the focus on social cognition by
researchers has eclipsed more general cognitive differences: if
so, social competence might be a side-effect of some other,
external factor; or selection for social skill might give side-bene-
fits in other areas. Critical to this debate is whether primates are
specialized in social intelligence but remain primitive in their
representation of the physical environment, or show advanced
intelligence in any domain that is tested. The debate is an old
one also in human intelligence: the question of single-factor (g)
versus multiple intelligences has been long-discussed, and
time has brought no clear resolution. The case for modular social
intelligence in monkeys was made by Cheney and Seyfarth
(1985, 1990), but a recent meta-analysis of an extensive range
of laboratory tests of primate ability supports single-factor intel-
ligence in primates (Deaner et al., 2006). Under natural condi-
tions, too, there is evidence in favor of a single factor behind
differences in species intelligence among primates: a similar
relationship has been found with brain size in social skills (decep-
tion [Byrne and Corp, 2004], social learning [Reader and Laland,
2001]) and physical skills (tool-use and innovation [Reader and
Laland, 2001]). The forcing function that led to species differ-
ences in primate ancestry might therefore have been challenge
in either social or physical cognition—or both, at different times
in evolution. There is growing evidence for the latter scenario.
Brain-size differences and reliance on sophisticated social
maneuvering are well correlated across primate species ingeneral, and the relationship of brain size to group size provides
a strong case that social challenges selected for intellectual
advance over a long—60 Mya—timescale. As suggested above,
‘‘social’’ should be seen to include challenges met by information
processing in the context of predator/prey interactions, as well
as those from living with conspecifics. With this interpretation,
linked increases in intelligence and brain size in a much wider
range of species may be understood.
But in the great apes, that theory fails: social challenge, as
measured by group size, does not differ between ape and
monkey species, whereas capacity in some cognitive dimen-
sions—such as understanding cooperation, intention and decep-
tion, and mirror self-recognition—do (Byrne, 1997a). Instead,
what is notable about apes, contra monkeys, is that all genera
of living great apes show special skills in manual food processing:
Pongo, in accessing spiny rattans and palms (Russon, 1998) and
for extracting honey and seeds with tools (Fox et al., 1999);
Gorilla, for processing physically defended herb resources
(Byrne, 2001); Pan, in collecting insect foods with tools, often
ones made themselves and sometimes sets of two tools for
a more complex task (McGrew, 1994; Sanz and Morgan, 2007).
Moreover, in captivity all great apes demonstrate remarkably
similar tool-using and tool-making abilities, though many popula-
tions show no tool-use in the wild (McGrew, 1989), suggesting
that the underlying cognitive skills—all ones to do with feeding—
have an ancient origin in the common ancestry of all the
modern lines. For these reasons, it has been argued that the
cognition of the great apes (that is, the qualitative differences
from monkeys in their understanding of mechanism and mind)
developed over a much shorter timescale, since the living species
share common ancestry at about 16 Mya (Byrne, 1997a).
Why should great apes have faced greater challenges in the
physical environment than monkeys? They are all larger-bodied
and adapted to brachiation, allowing small-branch feeding but
making long-range travel inefficient; yet in nearly all habitats
they are found today, great apes compete directly with monkeys
for ripe fruit and tender leaves. Old World monkeys are able to
digest coarser material than apes, so able to exploit ripening
plant food before their competitors. Since monkeys appear to
possess all the aces, it becomes a problem to explain why great
apes did not become extinct (although many species did, after
14 Mya). The suggestion is that the surviving great apes were
able to compete by developing skills to reach foods that mon-
keys could not reach, as shown today in their expertise at
extracting insects and dealing with plant defenses (Byrne,
1997a): abilities that give them advantages in the domain of phys-
ical rather than social cognition. The finding in corvid species,
few of which are social, of remarkably similar cognitive skills to
those of apes similarly points to physical cognition as the driving
function for these capacities (Emery and Clayton, 2004, 2009).
An interesting exception to the lack of need for tool use in
monkeys is the recent discovery of hammer and anvil use in
wild capuchin monkeys (Cebus libidinosus) (Fragaszy et al.,
2004; Moura and Lee, 2004). The monkeys transport heavy
stones to nut-cracking sites, selectively choosing stones of
appropriate hardness and size, and of weights appropriate to
different kinds of nuts cracked, showing an ability to anticipate
their future needs (Greenberg et al., 2009; Visalberghi et al.,Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 823
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areas of Brazil, but always in arid and inhospitable ones:
although capuchin manual skills in no way rival those of great
apes, it may be significant that they are similarly brought to their
apex by severe feeding challenge.
Increasing evidence suggests that, at least in great apes, the
repertoire of cognitive skills in any individual also depends on
opportunities for social acquisition of knowledge (van Schaik
et al., 1999; van Schaik and Knott, 2001; strong evidence for
transmission of social habits has also been found in capuchin
monkeys, Perry et al., 2003; Perry and Manson, 2003). ‘‘Species
intelligence,’’ by analogy with usage of the term intelligence in
differential psychology, refers to the innate potential for cognitive
power of every individual of the species; but the extent to which
that potential is realized may depend on an individual’s social
network (Meulman and Van Schaik, 2009). This ‘‘cultural intelli-
gence’’ view applies most radically to the difference between
individuals reared in the wild or captivity: between the bleak
circumstances of an old-fashioned zoo and the enriched envi-
ronment of a human home, or between either and the complex
environment of a tropical forest. We expect that among wild
populations of some animals (at least, the great apes) the set
of cognitive skills in any population will differ, not simply because
of the social group size or group complexity, but more specifi-
cally on the opportunities for social learning afforded to individ-
uals within the population.
The Cognitive Basis for Differences in Social Abilities
We have suggested that two accounts are required to explain the
differences in cognitive skills observed among primates, as well
as some other animals. Quantitative differences in social knowl-
edge and social tactics, as seen in several mammalian radiations
and in which neocortex size correlates with social group size,
need to be distinguished from the qualitative differences in
understanding, seen in great apes, some corvids, and possibly
others such as dolphins and elephants.
The quantitative differences are the simpler to explain: as vari-
ation in memory abilities (Byrne, 1996a). If neocortical volume
affects the ability to record information about identity, associa-
tion patterns, and past histories of behavior of individuals, then
a need to live in socially more challenging settings would be
expected to select for increase in neocortex size, underwriting
continuous variation in abilities. Correlated increases in nonso-
cial abilities are a by-product of this selective effect, based on
the fact that a large and efficient system of perceptual categori-
zation and memory has many other uses.
A bigger problem is to explain the qualitative differences in
social understanding, seen in fewer taxa and not associated
with social group size. Although no nonhuman has clearly
been shown to represent false belief, the abilities of great apes—
and some corvine birds, dolphins, and perhaps a few other
species—in cooperation, deception, perception of intent, and
mirror self-recognition, seem sufficiently distinct from those of
monkeys and all other terrestrial mammals to require a different
explanation. We develop one possibility here, based on mental
representation of behavioral structure, but others are surely
possible.
The issue is to what extent innate structure is needed to
ground new knowledge—and this is nowhere more acute than824 Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.in the social domain. Both in primatology and developmental
psychology, researchers have shown that statistical regularities
can be extracted from complex input information, potentially
underwriting remarkable abilities that are often ascribed to
more ‘‘thinking’’ processes. Most dramatically, 8-month-old
infants were found able to segment fluent speech after only
2 min exposure: since the speech was made up of artificially
generated nonsense syllables, only the rules by which the sylla-
bles were made up from letter sounds could have allowed this
segmentation, showing a powerful innate ability to detect and
use statistical regularities (Saffran et al., 1996). Adult humans,
shown videos of familiar manual activities reduced to moving
patterns of fluorescent dots on limb-joints, were able to segment
the activities into phases which corresponded to meaningful
subroutines of the overall behavioral program, even though
the subjects had no indication what each activity was about
(Baldwin et al., 2008). In the nonhuman primate domain, Byrne
(1999, 2003) showed that the ability of great apes to learn novel
structures of skilled action by observation can parsimoniously be
accounted for by just such behavior parsing abilities, without
requiring prior understanding of the model’s purposes or how
their behavior achieved its effect. When a goal-directed manual
activity is carried out repeatedly by a skilled practitioner, the
activity contains clues in its pattern of statistical variation—the
location of pauses, the sections of process that can be omitted
or substituted with others, the regularity of sequences of certain
steps among the general variation of movements—which allow
the underlying ‘‘program-level’’ structure of action to be dis-
cerned. This may account for the differences among animals in
imitative learning. For instance, although imitation has often
been claimed in primates, most cases can be accounted for
rather simply as priming effects, acting upon existing motor skills,
rather than involving new learning (Byrne, 2002a; Hoppitt and
Laland, 2008). Only in the great apes does it seem that imitation
involves learning new skills by assembly of novel actions from
components (a recent challenge to the data underlying this state-
ment [Tennie et al., 2008] is based on a misunderstanding of
program-level imitation, and consequently an analysis at such a
general level that even major differences in processing would not
be apparent [see Byrne, 2003]). This difference implies that only
great apes, among primates, have behavior-parsing capacities.
Can this theoretical formulation be extended more generally in
the social domain? In principle, it would seem so: just as the
behavior parsing model, in its rather Humean approach to
causality, treats correlations as causal, so intentions may be
treated as those results that satisfy an agent that has been
seen to be engaged in directed activity (Byrne, 2006). In this
way, it should be possible for any animal with a natural ability
to parse behavior to determine the goals of others and relate
those goals to the individuals’ prior histories, provided they are
allowed sufficient experience from which to extract statistical
regularities. Admittedly, this allows only a weak understanding
of intention, but perhaps that is all any nonhuman primate is
capable of representing. From an evolutionary point of view,
the issue is only whether advantage is conferred over individuals
with no understanding of intention.
However, without some extra ingredient, this approach would
have difficulty in accounting for the differences between species:
Neuron
Reviewthe failures and inadequacies become the stumbling block for
comparative explanation, rather than the successes. On current
evidence, only a few species show ‘‘extra,’’ qualitatively different
social capacities compared to most mammals and birds: why
just them? Dealing with this concern may require a more Kantian
formulation, in which some crucial mental structure(s) must be
innate, and differ qualitatively between taxa, whereas statistical
extraction of regularities ‘‘fills in the gaps’’ from practical experi-
ence. In an analogy from the physical domain, consider
monkeys’ representation of causal properties. Tamarin monkeys
are sensitive to the properties of material that are relevant to
tool-using, such as rigidity and length, but not color and texture,
despite not naturally using tools (Hauser, 1997). It seems that
monkeys are predisposed to represent properties that will—in
some species, in some environments—permit intelligent tool
use to be acquired. But in species that lack an innate predispo-
sition to represent the correct properties of materials, intelligent
tool use will never be developed.
What innate mental structure(s) might allow certain animal
taxa to develop ‘‘extra’’ capacities in the domain of social
behavior? In principle, ‘‘structure’’ can be provided in two inde-
pendent ways. The simpler way involves innate heuristics. For
instance, a well-known principle in animal learning is that innate
‘‘constraints’’ may focus learning on biologically useful things,
determining what is learned easily and what is not: rats associate
nausea but not electric shock with novel foods eaten many hours
earlier (Garcia et al., 1966); perhaps similar genetic channeling
determines that we so readily learn to fear spiders but have
to be strictly taught to fear electricity. At a more general level,
the degree of native curiosity and the tendency to latent learn-
ing, picking up useful knowledge from certain situations, will
be greater in species evolved to fill generalist niches in fast-
changing environments. Moreover, species that depend on
motor or social skills may be naturally playful during the juvenile
period, the play tending to allow development of an augmented
motor repertoire and social skills (Bruner, 1972; Caro, 1995;
Fagen, 1976; Whiten and Byrne, 1991).
This level of explanation can account for some of the quanti-
tative differences between species, for instance those depen-
dent upon the complexity of social system and fineness of
social categorization. When it comes to species differences
that imply deeper levels of understanding, it may be necessary
to invoke differences in cognitive architecture. For instance,
social transmission of information occurs in monkeys and
great apes, but the effects are apparently very different, with
monkeys unable to learn complex novel behavior by imitation
(Byrne, 2002a; Visalberghi and Fragaszy, 2000). Is this because
they have different cognitive systems? If species are not able
to form the same mental representations, then what they
can do with the same information may be radically different
(Byrne et al., 2004). For instance, any social vertebrate is likely
to benefit from social learning in some way, but those species
that code what they see in terms only of a ‘‘conspecific
engaged in activity at a place’’ may only gain from local
enhancement (Hoppitt and Laland, 2008). In contrast, if a
species is able to code the time sequence of specific actions
applied by that conspecific, what it learns will be much richer
(Byrne, 2002b).We propose that the distribution of behavior-parsing abilities
will be critical to species differences, both directly and indirectly.
Direct benefits accrue when understanding of others’ actions is
required to deal with challenges: for instance, when correct
interpretation of a social situation requires working out the inten-
tion behind another’s actions, or in imitatively acquiring a
complex skill that would be unlikely to be discovered by trial
and error exploration. In order to use the gist of another’s
behavior as a structure with which to build novel actions, it will
be essential to have, in tandem with the perceptual process of
behavior parsing, the ability to build up hierarchically organized
programs of goal-directed action, which will otherwise be
evident in general problem-solving behavior: planning capabil-
ities. Indirect benefits come from the informational content that
can be passed on by social learning and culture, allowing adap-
tation to local environments to be mediated by social learning as
well as genetical evolution (van Schaik et al., 1999; Washburn
and Benedict, 1979; Whiten, 2000).
In summary, we suggest that social cognition is not unique
to primates and that primate cognition is not uniquely social.
We argue that most demonstrations of cognitive skill can be
accounted for by quantitative differences in memory, with the
tendency to larger memory most likely being driven by social
competition (from conspecifics and from predator/prey interac-
tions). However, some particular skills such as insightful cooper-
ation or deception, perception of intent, imitation of novel skills,
and mirror self-recognition, signify a qualitatively different repre-
sentation of mechanisms and minds. This probably relies on the
presence of specific cognitive architecture that allows for
behavior parsing and the formation of hierarchically organized
programs of action, the selection for which may have been driven
by physical constraints. Our account of behavior parsing has
necessarily been focused narrowly on primates: the evidence
is just not there for other species, including those unusual
species that show convergent abilities with great apes. The chal-
lenge for future research will be to discover whether this explana-
tion might apply more generally or whether a wholly new theory
of higher-order cognitive abilities will need to be developed to
explain the full pattern.
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